Most friends find it difficult or even impossible to believe or even consider that nationalisation of banks (in 1969 and 1980) was anything other than an economic masterstroke.
Well, they can't really be blamed. That is what we have been brainwashed with over the last 50 + years. The irony is that no political party, irrespective of persuasion, wants to call out this bluff. The benefits of having a pliable banking sector under constant leash is too lucrative.
Most economists, social scientists, or policy makers, who should be aware of the horrendous and prolonged ill-effects of this decision are unwilling to go on record if they have any misgivings. It is human nature that it is extremely difficult to go against the grain. (With the honourable exception of Arvind Subramanium - his view is included in this essay).
There are at least three conundurams to the issue of bank nationalisation. First, was it essentially a political bluff or an economic game-changer. Second, has this decision adversely affected our economy and society and how. Third, what can be done to rectify the situation, if it needs rectification.
This is the first part of my series where I give evidence as to why I changed my opinion and am now convinced that the sole reason for nationalisation of banks was purely political for extremely petty and selfish reasons.
From: Of Counsel by Arvind Subramanian (page 18)
If you were to ask me what the two egregious economic sins we committed in the past were, they are the Industrial Policy Resolution, which started the licensing of industry, and bank nationalisation in 1969.
Extract from
Jairam Ramesh’s biography of PN Haksar (Intertwined Lives – P N Haksar
& Indira Gandhi), who masterminded the nationalisation of
banks announced by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
As late as 9 July
1969, [PN] Haksar was not entirely convinced that banks had to be nationalised
right away. Then three days later came the assault on Indira Gandhi’s authority
with the announcement of Sanjiva Reddy as the Congress’s presidential candidate
(12/07/1969). Subsequently, Morarji Desai’s resignation was secured after four
days (16/07/1969).
My guess is that
between 12 July 1969 and 15 July 1969, Haksar and Indira Gandhi must have
confabulated and decided to shed their caution on bank nationalisation. On 16
July 1969, she asked PNH to meet with KN Raj, one of India’s most distinguished
economists and find out his views on bank nationalisation.
Another eminent
economist, PN Dhar, was also present when PNH and K N Raj met. Dhar was to
later write that Raj strongly favoured nationalisation but felt it would take
at least six months to carry it out.
But just three
days later, on 19 July 1969, 14 banks were indeed nationalised, making one of
Indira Gandhi’s “stray thoughts” an immediate reality. This account is from the
memoirs of DN Ghosh, who was then the official concerned in the banking
division of the Ministry of Finance and who was to later become the chairman of
the State Bank of India (SBI). It was the night of 17 July 1969 and Ghosh
recalls being summoned to Haksar’s residence:
I
saw that Haksar was browsing through a mass of papers, among which I could spot
the Reserve Bank publication, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India. He
was trying to figure out how many banks accounted for 80 per cent to 85 per
cent of the total resources of the system. Off the cuff, I said the number
could be 10 to 12 banks.
Just
then, the Union Minister of State for Company Affairs, KV Raghunatha Reddy,
strolled in and stood listening to our discussion. He piped up that it was a
golden political opportunity to nationalise all banks and that we should go
ahead with the bold decision. Haksar waived his suggestion politely and
requested him to keep his impetuous radicalism to himself.
Haksar
wanted to be left alone till he himself had been fully briefed on a subject
that was entirely foreign to him. I then asked him if the Prime Minister had
made up her mind on nationalising the banks. “Not yet”, he replied. “We are to
discuss this tomorrow morning.” He was not sure if it would be possible to sort
out all the legal conundrums involved and have the ordinance [for nationalisation]
ready by 19 July which was a Saturday. The date was crucial for two reasons.
[Acting] President VV Giri was due to demit office on the forenoon of 20 July
and the Lok Sabha would begin its monsoon session on 21 July.
The choice of
Ghosh by Haksar to be the “keeper of secrets” as far as bank nationalisation
was concerned reveals much of how PNH operated.
A Bakshi, who was
then deputy governor of the RBI, had worked with Haksar in London in the early
1950s. They were ideologically also similar and were exceedingly close personal
friends. Thanks to Haksar, Bakshi would join the soon-to-be-created
department of banking in the Ministry of Finance and later become the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) of India in 1972. It was Bakshi who
had given the seal of approval to Ghosh and had joined the duo late that night
of 17 July 1969 for confabulations.
The next day (18th
July 1969), Ghosh writes, the prime minister herself summoned him in the
morning. She wanted to be convinced that the legislative draft for
nationalisation of banks could actually be prepared in less than 24 hours. When
she was told that such a draft had, in fact, existed from the end of 1963 when
nationalisation of five banks had first been considered, she appeared to
relax and swore Ghosh to absolute secrecy saying that in case of any hitch he
should apprise PNH.
For the next few
hours, Haksar, Bakshi, Ghosh and a few others who had been specially
commandeered for this purpose, like RK Seshadri (an RBI official) and Niren De
(attorney general) slogged to prepare the ordinance – which was an executive
order that would have to be ratified by Parliament later.
At 8.30 pm on the
night of 19 July 1969, Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on radio and
announced the nationalisation of banks.
From:
India – Government & Politics in a Developing Nation
Robert
L Hardgrave Jr, & Stanley A Kochanek
In an effort to
build and maintain a progressive image, the Congress party over the years had
adopted a series of resolutions promising a fundamental transformation of the
Indian economy. These resolutions had acquired an increasingly radical tone as
Congress fortunes began to slip at the polls. Calls for nationalisation of
private-sector banks, insurance companies, and key industries entered the
Congress program.
Demands for
redistributive justice became embroiled in Congress factional politics when
Indira Gandhi’s power was challenged by her senior and more conservative
colleagues in the Cabinet and the party. Mrs Gandhi, on the advise of P N
Haksar, decided to counter this challenge by transforming the factional dispute
into an ideological crusade. …. The strategy was a resounding political success
and resulted in reversing the process of economic liberalization. (Page 361).
From : Barons of Banking –
Glimpses of Indian Banking History by Bakhtiyar K Dadabhoy
(Dr.
I G) Patel gives us his version of events in his memoirs. Indira Gandhi sent
for him and asked him if banking was under his charge. No one else was present.
On his telling her it was, she simply said: ‘For political reasons,
it has been decided to nationalise the banks. You have to prepare within 24
hours the bill, a note for the Cabinet and a speech for me to make to the
nation on the radio tomorrow evening. Can you do it and make sure there is no
leak?’ (Page 305)
Dadabhoy has supported this view
point by referring to The Evolution of the State Bank of India (Vol 3, Pae 34)
From: Perspectives on
Development by Dr. V V Bhatt (GM & CEO IDBI at that time)
By 1969, prominent
commercial banks were nationalised by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, purely for
political reasons. L K Jha (RBI Governor) was not in favour of this policy.
Neither was I. I wrote an article in the Economic and Political Weekly (October
1970) criticising the move (I have been unable to access this article).
From: Interview of Y V
Reddy published on 15/07/2019
https://www.bqprime.com/business/dont-allow-public-sector-banks-to-whither-away-says-yv-reddy
“Banks were
nationalised at the whim of a Prime Minister, they will be de-nationalised at
the whim of another Prime Minister.” Y V Reddy.
From: Bank Nationalisation:
The Original Sin by DN Ghosh
https://www.bqprime.com/opinion/bank-nationalisation-the-original-sin
So, is bank
nationalisation the original sin? Alternatively, was it a case of bad economics
but good politics? To answer all that, some contextualisation is necessary.
From: Finance at the
Frontier by J D von Pischke
Commercial banks were
considered by some central bankers, government officials, academicians and by
many politicians to be at best indifferent to farmers and at worst unpatriotic corporate
citizens.
This report (Report of
the Expert Group on State Enactments Having a Bearing on Commercial Banks
Lending to Agriculture – Talwar Committee 1971) dispels the view that prior
to their nationalization Indian commercial banks were unwilling to lend in
rural areas because of urban bias or lack of interest. (PS: I have been unable
to locate this report).
From: Breading the Mould by Raghuram Rajan & Rohit Lamba
A similar approach is needed for momentous policy decisions. … Yet by
their very nature, they occur without much consultation, are often based on
short-term political calculations, and can have unintended effects, especially
in large, complex modern economies. Arguably, the 1969 nationalisation of banks
and the 2016 demonetisation both fall in this category. (Page 114)
Both the overnight bank nationalisation in 1969 and the declaration of
the Emergency in 1975 were done suddenly and without much consultation. Few
would assert they benefited the nation. (Page 252)